Lauda: Absolut. Die hat mich geheiratet, und drei Wochen später war der Unfall. Ich war ein unglaublicher Egoist damals. Durch die Todesgefahr, der ich mich. Dez. Mercedes-Boss Niki Lauda spricht nach seiner Lungen-Operation, vergleicht die Zeit im Krankenhaus mit der nach seinem FormelUnfall am. 2. Aug. Immer noch schwer gezeichnet stellt sich Lauda fünf Wochen nach dem Feuer- Unfall der Öffentlichkeit September Immer noch schwer.
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Learn more More Like This. Closer to the Edge Formula 1 TV Series Crash and Burn The story of Irishman Tommy Byrne, the greatest racing driver you never saw.
Edit Cast Credited cast: Himself Hans Joachim Stuck Himself Rest of cast listed alphabetically: The thrilling and miraculous journey of a Formula One legend.
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On February 22, , Nicholas Andreas Lauda was born in Vienna into a prominent Austrian business and banking dynasty.
Starting in a Mini in , he crashed his way through Formula Vee and Formula Three and in he bought his way into the March Formula Two and Formula One teams with another bank loan secured by his life insurance policy.
The uncompetitive Marches meant Niki was unable to prove his worth as a driver, let alone stave off pending bankruptcy.
With no qualifications in any other line of work he had no choice but to keep on racing. For he talked his way into a complicated rent-a-ride deal with BRM.
During that season his ever-improving results paid dividends in the form of a new contract that would forgive his debts in exchange for Niki staying with BRM for a further two years.
Instead, he bought his way out of BRM with money from his new employer Enzo Ferrari, for whom he went to work in After his first test in the Ferrari Niki informed Enzo that the car was "a piece of shit," but promised him he could make it raceworthy.
Niki said that learning from mistakes was the fastest way to improve, corroborating this theory with a first Formula One victory in Spain, then another in Holland.
Claiming that his mounting collection of "useless" trophies was cluttering up his home in Austria, he gave them to the local garage in exchange for free car washes.
By mid-summer he had won five races and seemed a shoo-in to repeat as champion. Then came the German Grand Prix at the desperately dangerous Nurburgring.
Four brave drivers and a marshal plunged into the towering inferno and hauled out the smouldering body. In hospital, with first to third degree burns on his head and wrists, several broken bones and lungs scorched from inhaling toxic fumes, Niki Lauda was given up for dead and administered the last rites by a priest.
Six weeks later, with blood seeping from the bandages on his head, he finished fourth in the Italian Grand Prix. Astonished doctors said he had recovered by sheer force of will.
Jackie Stewart said it was the most courageous comeback in the history of sport.Niki Lauda, Ferrari Später nutzte er sie als Werbefläche für seine unternehmerischen Aktivitäten. Giftige Dämpfe verätzten damals das Organ. Merzario erinnert sich Jahre später an diese Augenblicke: Csgo free gambling Medienberichten war der dreimalige FormelWeltmeister bereits seit rueda de casino dallas Woche im Krankenhaus. Nur 42 Tage nach dem Unfall startet er wieder in Monza Foto:
Thursday 30 May South China Morning Post. Tuesday 25 May Retrieved on 26 May Retrieved on 16 March Observer Sport Monthly at The Guardian.
Retrieved on 15 February The New York Times. Retrieved on 26 January Associated Press at The Seattle Times. Thursday 6 June Retrieved 17 March Consuls General in Chiang Mai ".
Archive Department of State. Retrieved on 14 February Monday, 9 September Retrieved from " https: Airliner accidents and incidents caused by mechanical failure Aviation accidents and incidents in Aviation accidents and incidents in Thailand Accidents and incidents involving the Boeing in Thailand Lauda Air accidents and incidents May events.
CS1 Thai-language sources th Webarchive template wayback links Use dmy dates from May All articles with unsourced statements Articles with unsourced statements from May Articles with Thai-language external links Coordinates on Wikidata.
Vienna International Airport , Vienna , Austria. Don Mueang Airport Crash site Location of stopover and crash site.
All times in this report are UTC. The flight departed Bangkok at hours on May 26, for the final flight sector to Vienna Austria. All pre-flight, ground, and flight operations appear routine until five minutes and forty five seconds after the cockpit voice recorder CVR recorded the sounds of engine power being advanced for takeoff.
At this point a discussion ensued between the crew members regarding an event later identified as a crew alert associated with a thrust reverser isolation valve.
The crew discussed this alert for some four and one half minutes. No actions were required, and none were identified as being taken.
Ten minutes and twenty seconds into the flight the co-pilot advised the pilot-in-command of the need for rudder trim to the left. Twenty nine seconds later the CVR recording ended with multiple sounds thought to be structural breakup.
Flight conditions were recovered from non-volatile memory in the left engine electronic engine control EEC. At the suspected point of reverser deployment, the EEC readout indicated that the airplane was at an approximate altitude of 24, feet, a speed of Mach 0.
The airplane crashed in mountainous jungle terrain at 14 degrees 44 minutes North latitude and 99 degrees 27 minutes East longitude at approximately hours.
Night time visual meteorological conditions prevailed. This certificate carried a rating for Airplane Multi-engine Land, with type ratings for B, B, and B airplane.
The certificate also carried a rating for Airplane Single Engine Land which was limited to Commercial Pilot privileges. His total flight time as of April 25, was approximately 11, hours.
The co-pilot, Josef Thumer, first officer, male, 41 years of age, held an Airline Transport Pilot certificate issued by the Department of Civil Aviation of Austria, issued April 24 , valid until October 24, His total flight time was approximately 6, hours.
It was powered by two Pratt and Whitney engines, serial number P on the left, and serial number P on the right.
Engine records indicate the left engine was installed on October 3, , and had 2, The right engine was installed on September 15, , and had 7, The airplane technical log, serial number , dated May 26, , shows the airframe with 7, The reason for the minor variation in cycle count between the airframe and right engine is not known.
Technical logs, component status records, and the Lauda trouble shooting file maintained by their Maintenance Control were reviewed as far back as November 30, The majority of the corrective actions involved removing and replacing valves or actuators, and adjustments to the system.
Typically then the PIMU message would not reoccur for several flights. The most recent known action prior to the accident was on May 25, at Vienna.
At this time, a left engine thrust reverser locking actuator was replaced. The company continued to dispatch the airplane on its regular schedule, with troubleshooting accomplished after return to the home station.
Lauda personnel stated, they were in the process of conducting a complete inspection of the left thrust reverser wire bundle for damage before the accident occurred.
The last record of visual inspection for the wiring was entered in a trouble shooting log, kept by Lauda Maintenance Department, on March 26, The right engine thrust reverser had three maintenance items logged against it since August 14, , and these were all for reasons of component wear and service bulletin requirements.
The takeoff report from Bangkok was successfully transmitted and recorded. Previous takeoff and cruise reports were also available through this system.
A review of this historical data did not reveal any unusual indication in the airplane or engine parameters or any marked differences between the right and left engines.
The temperature was The significant weather prognosis chart for flight level through flight level from Don Muang Airport weather personnel, valid until hours on May 27, forecast broken layer tops at flight level and isolated embedded cumulonimbus with tops as high as flight level This forecast covered the general route area between Bangkok and Rangoon.
No pilot reports of weather activity in the general vicinity of the accident site were received, and air traffic personnel stated no weather returns were observed on the radar at the time of the accident.
Radar tracking was not recorded. No discrepancies were noted on any communications equipment that could be expected to have a bearing on the accident.
Its recording medium was damaged by heat, and no useful information could be recovered. Although damaged, it was successfully read out, and a transcript extract of its contents is included in this report as Appendix A.
The average elevation of the wreckage area was estimated to be metres. Most of the wreckage was found in a one square kilometer area, but some lighter weight components were found up to 2, metres from the initial impact point.
Thrust reverser actuators from the left engine both sleeves were found in the fully deployed position. A diagram of the wreckage spread is included in this report as Appendix B.
No fire fighting activities took place due to the remote location and general inaccessibility of the accident site.
The limited number and the degree of damage to the components precluded a determination of functional condition.
Approximately 9 months after the accident, the DCV was returned to Department of Aviation by persons not associated with the accident investigation.
The DCV was exchanged for a reward. DCV examination was conducted on February 18 through 20, This is the normal position for the valve without hydraulic pressure applied.
Further examination of the spring that holds the second stage spool in position indicated that it was intact. The examination of the DCV also revealed that 3 of 4 screws used to secure the solenoid operated pilot valve body to the DCV were loose.
Soil was found inside internal passages of the valve. A metal plug, identified as a case relief valve plug used elsewhere in the engine accessory section, was found installed "finger tight" in the DCV "retract" port.
All solenoid operated pilot valve first stage spool internal passages were unobstructed. There was no evidence that indicated preimpact failure of the valve, however the condition of the valve indicated that the valve was partially disassembled and reassembled by persons not associated with the accident investigation prior to examination by the investigation team.
Additional system tests were performed using production components in an attempt to simulate potential failure modes. In one hypothetical condition, the introduction of a damaged piece of O-ring seal into a hydraulic orifice resulted in an uncommanded opening of the directional control valve DCV.
For further information on these tests, see paragraph 2. Testing of the electrical function indicated possible areas where an electrical hot short occurring simultaneously with an auto-restow action could result.
A full hydraulic set-up was used to verify normal operation of the thrust reverser system and to determine if uncommanded deployment could occur under various hypothetical failure conditions.
Hypothetical failure conditions involved the directional control valve DCV seal damage, thrust reverser actuator piston head seal leakage and a return line blockage during hydraulic isolation valve HIV cycling.
In another hypothetical failure condition, the effects of piston seal leakage through a thrust reverser actuator was examined with the HIV open.
Several test configurations were examined with the piston head O-ring and cap strip missing from the actuator s. Only one side one of two sleeves of the thrust reverser cowl deployed when an actuator was tested with the piston head seal missing and the bronze plating separated from the piston head.
Under this condition, with the HIV open, internal leakage across the piston was sufficient to deploy the 3 actuators associated with the deployed sleeve depending on the location of the actuator piston head in the cylinders.
If in the stow position and the piston heads were firmly bottomed against the inner cylinder head end prior to commanding thrust reverser stow, the thrust reverser actuators would not deploy.
When the head end of the two actuators were slightly unseated, fluid could pass from the rod end to the head end of the locking actuator causing unlock and extension of 3 actuators one sleeve.
The cap strip from this actuator piston head had considerable wear and was extruded. A DCV was mounted on a vibration table and subjected to resonant searches, resonant dwells, random vibration and sweeps through engine speed.
Pressure transducers and flow meters on the outflow of the valve indicated that the valve did not open unexpectedly or leak during the test under excessive vibration.
The thrust reversers are approved for ground operation only. A general systems description is included in this report as appendix C. The FAA issued information on the accident to appropriate operators and authorities on September 11, by letter format.
It is included in this report as appendix E. AD , July 3, - Requires tests, inspections and functional checks of the thrust reverser systems on all B airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney PW series engines.
This superseded AD This superseded TAD 1. AD 9 , October 11, - Requires modification and allowed re-activation of thrust reverser systems on all B airplanes powered by Pratt and Whitney PW series engines.
This superseded TAD Since this information was critical to the investigation, a search was conducted to identify non-volatile memory in various computerized components as an alternate source of data.
The data developed proved helpful in validating conditions prior to and during the accident, but did not provide the time correlation normally available with the DFDR.
The airplane was certificated, equipped and maintained according to regulations and approved procedures. Flight documents indicate that the gross weight and c.
The weather in the area was fair at the time of the accident. Although there were no reported hazardous weather phenomena, isolated lightning was possible.
There are few visible landmarks and population centers on the ground along the route of flight and it is possible that the horizon was not distinguishable.
Recovery from any unusual flight attitude could have been affected by the lack of outside visual references. The pilot-in-command stated "that keeps coming on.
This indication appears when a fault has been detected in the thrust reverser system. It indicates a disagreement. No corrective actions were necessary and none were identified as taken by the crew.
The co-pilot read information from the Airplane Quick Reference Handbook as follows: Airplane design changes implemented after this accident eliminated the need for operational guidance for the flightcrew.
Review of the thrust reverser system design indicates that when the auto-restow system function is required, system pressure to close the reversers is applied during restow and for 5 seconds after restow is sensed.
The specific interval of illumination of the light, and the possibility that the light ceased to be observed, could not be determined from the cockpit voice recorder comments nor from any other evidence.
There was no recoverable data from the nonvolatile memory available in the recovered EICAS components. At ten minutes twenty seven seconds into the flight, the co-pilot advised the pilot-in-command that there was need for, "a little bit of rudder trim to the left.
It ended with the pilot-in-command saying "O. It is probable that the trim requirement was a normal event in the flight profile. The trim requirement does not appear to be related to the upcoming reverser event, and there was no apparent reason for the crew to interpret it as such.
The physical evidence at the crash site conclusively showed that the left engine thrust reverser was deployed. Nonvolatile computer memory within the electronic engine control EEC indicated that an anomaly occurred between channel A and B reverser sleeve position signals.
It was concluded that this anomaly was associated with the thrust reverser deployment of one or both sleeves. The EEC data indicated that the thrust reverser deployed in-flight with the engine at climb power; based on EEC design, it was also concluded that the engine thrust was commanded to idle commensurate with the reverser deployment, and that the recorded mach number increased from 0.
The left EEC data indicates that the fuel cutoff switch was probably selected to cutoff within 10 seconds of thrust reverser deployment.
Examination of the cutoff switch also indicates that it was in the cutoff position at impact. A breakup altitude estimation was attempted using time-synchronized information from the CVR.
Although the airspeed history between reverser deployment and the end of the recording due to structural breakup cannot be confirmed, the high speeds likely achieved during the descent indicate that the in-flight breakup most likely occurred at an altitude below 10, feet.
Damage to the fan runstrips sic on both engines indicates nontypical loads from an unusual flight path. The fan rubstrips are located on the forward case of each engine and form the fan blade tip airseal.
Each engine fan runstrip sic had a deep rub from the fan blades. The character of the rubs is typical of rubs caused by the interaction with the rotating fan.
The depths are substantially deeper than typical rubs experienced during normal operation. These rubs were centered at approximately 66 degrees on the left engine and approximately 0 degrees on the right engine as view from the rear of the engine looking forward.
Flight testing of the B with JT9D-7R4 engines showed rubs near the top of the engines to be minor depth and centered at approximately 45 degrees on the left engine and approximately degrees on the right engine.
The rub results from aerodynamic load from the engine cowls. These loads were determined to be essentially down from the top when the aircraft nose was lowered during descent.
The PW installation is designed for the maximum cowl aerodynamic loads that occur during takeoff rotation. At that condition a. This rub would be due to upward aerodynamic force on the cowl at aircraft rotation angles of attack.
The depth and location of the rubs in the. Lauda accident indicates; 1 cowl load forces much greater than the forces expected during takeoff rotation and 2 by the location, that the forces were essentially down from the top of the cowl.
The CVR transcript indicates that the in-flight breakup did not occur immediately after the deployment of the thrust reverser, but rather during the subsequent high-speed descent.
The EEC can provide general altitude and Mach number data however calibration is not provided outside the normal speed envelope. Information from the engine manufacturer indicates that the EEC data may indicate altitude and Mach numbers which are higher than the true value.
Also, EEC calibration of its ambient pressure sensor affects the accuracy of the recorded Mach number and altitude. This calibration is not designed to be accurate above maximum certified airplane speeds.
In addition, the EEC ambient pressure calibration does not account for the effect of reverse thrust on fan cowl static pressure ports.
However, EEC recorded data does suggest that the airplane was operating beyond the dive velocity of 0. High structural loading most probably resulted as the crew attempted to arrest the descent.
Parts of the airplane that separated from buffeting overload appear to be pieces of the rudder and the left elevator.
This was followed by the down-and- aft separation. No evidence of impacts were observed on the leading edges of the horizontal and vertical stabilizers indicating that no airframe structural failure occurred prior to horizontal stabilizer separation.
It is thought that the download still present on the left stabilizer and the imbalance in the empennage from the loss of the right stabilizer introduced counterclockwise aft looking forward orientation torsional overload into the tail, as evidenced by wrinkles that remained visible in the stabilizer center section rear spar.
The separation of the vertical and left horizontal stabilizers then occurred, although the evidence was inconclusive as to whether the vertical stabilizer separated prior to or because of the separation of the left stabilizer and center section.
The damage indicated that the vertical stabilizer and the attached upper portion of four fuselage frames departed to the left and that separation of the vertical fin-tip and the dual-sided stringer buckling in the area of the fin-tip failure occurred from bending in both directions prior to the separation of the vertical stabilizer from the fuselage.
The loss of the tail of an airplane results in a sharp nose-over of the airplane which produces excessive negative loading of the wing. Evidence was present of downward wing failure.
This sequence was probably followed by the breakup of the fuselage. The complete breakup of the tail, wing, and fuselage occurred in a matter of seconds.
The audible fire warning system in the cockpit was silent. The absence of soot on the cabin outflow valve and in the cargo compartment smoke detectors indicates that no in-flight fire existed during pressurized flight.
Evidence indicates that the fire that developed after the breakup resulted from the liberation of the airplane fuel tanks.
No shrapnel or explosive residue was detected in any portion of the wreckage that was located. Evidence of an explosion or fire in the sky was substantiated by witness reports and analysis of portions of the airplane wreckage.
Although it is possible in some cases that some "in-air" fire damage was masked by ground fire damage, only certain portions of the airplane were identified as being damaged by fire in the air.
These include the outboard wing sections and an area of right, upper fuselage above the wing. Evidence on the fuselage piece of an "in-air" fire include soot patterns oriented with the airstream and the fact that the piece was found in an area of no post-crash ground fire.
Evidence of an "in-air" fire on the separated outboard portions of the right and left wings include that they were found in areas of no ground fire, yet were substantially burned.
The separated right wing portion had been damaged by fire sufficiently to burn through several fuel access panels.
In addition, one of the sooted fractures on the right wing section was abutted by a "shiny" fracture surface. These fracture characteristics show that the separation of the right wing section had preceded its exposure to fire or soot in the air, followed by the ground impact that produced the final, "shiny" portion of the fracture.
Generally, it appears that fire damage was limited to the wings and portions of the fuselage aft of the wing front spar except for the left mid-cabin passenger door.
Likewise, many areas of the fuselage aft of the wing front spar were devoid of fire damage. This is further indication that the airplane was not on fire while intact, but started burning after the breakup began.
The absence of any fire damage on the empennage indicates that it had separated prior to any in-air fire.
The sooting documented on the left mid-cabin passenger door is unique in that the fuselage and frame around the door were undamaged by fire or soot.
Even the seal around the door appeared to be only lightly sooted. The door was found in an area of no ground fire, indicating that the door was sooted before ground impact.
The sooting on the door, but not on the surrounding structure, may have resulted as the door separated from the fuselage during the breakup and travelled through a "fire ball" of burning debris.
It is not known why the door seal did not exhibit the same degree of sooting as the door itself, although it is possible that the soot would not adhere to the seal as well as to the door.
These efforts yielded erroneous results because the simulators were never intended for such use and did not contain the necessary performance parameters to duplicate the conditions of the accident flight.
NTSB requested the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group to develop an engineering simulation of in-flight reverse thrust for the conditions thought to have existed when the left engine thrust reverser deployed in the accident flight.
As previously stated, the flight data recorder FDR tape in the accident airplane was heat damaged, melted, and unreadable due to post-crash fire.
Flight conditions were therefore derived from the best available source, post-accident readout of the left engine EEC non-volatile memory parameters.
Test conditions were proposed by Boeing and accepted by the participants as follows: The left engine thrust reverser was configured to provide reverse thrust effect at the start of reverse cowl movement rather than phased to cowl position.
The right engine was set up to be controlled by the pilot through the throttle handle. Tests were run with pilot commanded right engine throttle cutback to idle following the reverser deployment on the left engine.
Tests were repeated with no throttle cutback on the right engine. The autopilot was engaged in single channel mode for all conditions. Upon initiation of pilot recovery action, the autopilot.
The autopilot does not operate the rudder under the conditions experienced by the accident airplane. The autopilot operates the rudder only while in the "autoland" mode of flight.
However, it was not considered to be significant. The left engine electronic control indicates that the thrust reverser deployed in the accident flight at approximately 0.
There were no high-speed wind tunnel or high-speed flight test data available on the effect of reverse thrust at such an airspeed.
To be suitable for use in the engineering simulation, in-flight reverse thrust data were needed for an airplane of similar configuration to the B This similarity was essential because the intensity and position of the reverse thrust airflow directly affects the controllability of the airplane.
Airplanes with wing-mounted engines such as the DC-8, DC, B and B have experienced in-flight reverse thrust, and according to Douglas Airplane Company, all models of the DC-8 including those airplanes retrofitted with high-bypass fan engines were certificated for the use of reverse thrust on the inboard engines in flight.
Although the B has wing-mounted engines, it also has longer engine pylons which place the engines farther ahead and below the leading edge of the wing compared to the B Available in-service data suggests that the farther the engine is located from the wing, the less likely its reverse thrust plume will cause a significant airflow disruption around the wing.
The B has wing mounted engines, however, its reverser system is located in the rear of the engine, below and behind the wing leading edge, also making it less likely to affect wing lift.
In the case of in-flight reverse thrust on large three or four engine airplanes, each engine produces a smaller percentage of. Based on engineering judgement the lower proportion of thrust and resultant airflow affects a smaller percentage of the wing, and therefore the effect of reverse thrust is less significant on a three or four engine airplane than on a two engine airplane.
The mechanical design and type of engine is also important in the event of in-flight reverse thrust. On large twin-engine transport airplane, the thrust reverser cascades are slightly below and in front of the wing.
At high thrust levels, the plume of thrust from the reverser produces a yawing moment and significantly disrupts airflow over the wing resulting in a loss of lift over the affected wing.
The loss of lift produces a rolling moment which must be promptly offset by coordinated flight control inputs to maintain level flight.
The yaw is corrected by rudder inputs. If corrective action is delayed, the roll rate and bank angle increase, making recovery more difficult.
Low-speed B wind tunnel data from was available up to airspeeds of about knots at low Mach numbers. From these wind tunnel data, an in-flight reverse thrust model was developed by Boeing.
The model was consistent with wing angle-of-attack, although it did approximate the wheel deflection, rudder deflection, and sideslip experienced in a idle-reverse flight test.
Since no higher speed test data existed, the Boeing propulsion group predicted theoretically the reverse thrust values used in the model to simulate high engine speed and high airspeed conditions.
These findings were inconsistent with CVR data and that it appeared fact that control was lost by a trained flightcrew in the accident flight.
Another simulation model was developed using low-speed test data collected from a model geometrically similar to the B at the Boeing Vertol wind tunnel.
Scale model high-speed testing would have required considerably more time for model development. Therefore low-speed data were used and extrapolated.
These tests included inboard aileron effectiveness, rudder effectiveness, and lift loss for the flaps up configuration at different angles-of- attack and reverse thrust levels, data not previously available.
Investigators from the Accident Investigation Commission of the Government of Thailand, the Austrian Accredited Representative and his advisers, the NTSB, FAA, and Boeing met in Seattle, Washington, in September to analyze the updated Boeing-developed simulation of airplane controllability for the conditions that existed when the thrust reverser deployed on the accident flight.
It takes about 6 to 8 seconds for the engine to spool down from maximum climb to idle thrust levels. Boeing re-programmed the B simulator model based on these new tests.
The Chief B Test Pilot of the Boeing Company was unable to successfully recover the simulator if corrective action was delayed more than 4 to 6 seconds.
The range in delay times was related to engine throttle movement. Recovery was accomplished by the test pilot when corrective action of full opposite control wheel and rudder deflection was taken in less than 4 seconds.
The EEC automatically reduced the power to idle on the left engine upon movement of the translating cowl.Ich wollte", so Lauda. Rücksicht hat er dabei auf niemanden genommen. Die beiden Rennen in Amerika gewann Hunt, Lauda wurde lediglich einmal Dritter; Lauda erklärte dies mit dem unter den kühleren herbstlichen Bedingungen weniger konkurrenzfähigen Ferrari. Dort wird der lichterloh brennende Wagen auch noch von Brett Lunger gerammt. An diesem Donnerstag wird Michael Schumacher 50 Jahre alt. Formel 1 Platz 17 Britische Formel 2 Meister Juli und Ungarn Die Fahrer sind sowieso nicht glücklich mit der Austragung des GP auf dem Nürburgring, da sie — insbesondere auch Lauda — erhebliche Sicherheitsbedenken haben. Als ich ankam, war er schon bewusstlos, hing leblos in den Gurten. Nein, ich habe nie Angst gehabt. Lauda mit Ehefrau Birgit bei der Weltpremiere von "Rush".